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I. INTRODUCTION 
The oceans cover 70% of the earth and have a total water 
surface of 140 million square miles.] As an essential component of 
* Staff Member, Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review. 
I COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUAUTY, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, OCEAN DUMP-
ING: A NATIONAL POLICY (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Ocean Dumping Report]. 
701 
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the environment, they contribute to the oxygen-carbon dioxide 
balance in the atmosphere, affect global climate, and provide a 
base for the earth's water supply.2 Since the advent of the indus-
trial revolution, however, the oceans have served yet another 
function: waste disposal. In 1979 alone, over 100 million tons of 
waste were dumped into United States ocean waters.3 
The results of such dumping have been catastrophic. By 1970, 
one-fifth of the nation's commercial shellfish beds were closed due 
to shellfish found to contain hepatitis, polio virus, and other 
pathogens.4 Moreover, dumping has caused heavy fish kills, and 
has created lifeless zones in the sea. 
Until recently, the practice of ocean dumping was largely unre-
gulated. In the early 1970's, however, increases in both the quan-
tity and toxicity of ocean dumped waste led to congressional 
concern.5 Recognizing the ocean as a valuable resource in need of 
protection, Congress passed the Marine Protection, Research and 
Sanctuaries Act of 1972 (MPRSA), also known as the Ocean 
Dumping Act,6 which provides for the comprehensive regulation 
of ocean dumping by the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA? and the Army Corps of Engineers. 
Despite congressional recognition of the dangers of ocean 
dumping, the decade following the enactment of MPRSA has seen 
both an increase in the quantity of ocean dumped material and a 
major reassessment of the policy assumptions underlying 
MPRSA.s Policy makers are beginning to recognize that, although 
ocean dumping poses severe threats to the marine environment, 
the impacts of alternative disposal options may be far worse.9 A 
, Id. 
3 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS JAN.-DEC. 
1980 ON ADMINISTRATION OF THE MARINE PROTECTION RESEARCH AND SANCTUARIES 
ACT OF 1972 9-10 (1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981 MPRSA Report]. 
4 1970 Ocean Dumping Report, supra note 1, at 12. 
5 See S. REP. No. 451, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 4236-40. 
6 Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 95-532, 86 Stat. 
1052 (codified as amended 16 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1434 (1982) & 33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1434 (1982) & 
33 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1444 (1976 & Supp. v 1981» [hereinafter cited as MPRSA]. 
7 See 33 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (1982). The Act also gives the Army Corps of Engineers some 
authority over the regulation of ocean dumping subject to the authority of the EPA 
administrator. 33 U.S.C. § 1413 (1982). 
8 See generally Spirer, The Ocean Dumping Deadline: Easing the Mandate Millstone, 11 
FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 2. 
9 See 42 Fed. Reg. 2462 (1977). See also City of New York v. United States Environmen-
tal Protection Agency, 543 F. Supp. 1084, 1103 (S.D. N.Y. 1981). 
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policy approach, known as the multimedium method of waste 
management, has emerged. to It assumes that the disposal of 
waste will impute some cost to society through damage to one or a 
combination of the three mediums: land, air, and water. Under 
the multimedium method, waste is deposited in the medium or 
mediums in which the smallest total cost to society will result. 11 
The multimedium view is articulated in City of New York v. 
United States Environmental Protection AgencyY In City of New 
York, the District Court for the Southern District of New York 
held that the regulations promulgated pursuant to the Ocean 
Dumping Act were defective because they precluded New York 
City's request to ocean dump without a proper consideration of 
both the environmental and economic impacts of each alternative 
disposal method available to New York City.13 
In response to this finding, the EPA is currently in the process 
of revising its regulations to conform to the instructions of the 
court.14 This Article will discuss the impact of City of New York 
and outline the EPA's current attempt to revise its regulations. 
The Article will first discuss the nature and dangers of waste 
material and the feasibility of dumping waste material in the 
ocean. The Article will then trace the development of a national 
policy toward ocean dumping and the eventual enactment of 
MPRSA and its regulations. Judicial review of MPRSA in the City 
of New York decision will then be discussed. The final sections will 
outline and evaluate EPA proposals for revision of the current 
ocean dumping regulations. 
II. THE NATURE AND DANGERS OF OCEAN DUMPED MATERIAL 
The damage which a given contaminant may cause in an 
ecosystem varies according to the type, concentration, and the 
form in which it is introduced to the marine environment. Only 
approximately ten percent of the total volume of wastes entering 
the oceans is the result of direct ocean dumping. 15 Although most 
10 See generally NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, MULTIMEDIUM MANAGEMENT OF 
MUNICIPAL SLUDGE (1978); see also NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM. ON OCEANS & ATMO-
SPHERE, THE ROLE OF THE OCEAN IN A WASTE MANAGEMENT STRATEGY (1981)[here-
in after cited as NACOA Report]. 
11 [d. at 2-8. 
12 543 F. Supp. 1084 (S.D. N.Y. 1981). 
13 [d. at 1099. 
14 See infra text and notes at notes 248-97. 
15 U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, A GUIDE TO REGULATIONS AND GUID-
ANCE FOR THE UTILIZATION AND DISPOSAL OF MUNICIPAL SLUDGE 34 (1980). 
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waste enters the ocean indirectly through means such as agricul-
tural runoff, polluted streams, or outfall pipes,16 the ten percent 
that is dumped directly into the ocean is of special environmental 
concern because it contains extremely harmful or toxic waste. 17 
Toxic1s chemicals may kill plants and animals. 19 More com-
monly, however, organisms experience sublethal effects, which 
may include reduced vitality or growth, reproductive failure, and 
interference with sensory functions.20 Heavy metals and PCB's 
may create a risk of cancer in many forms of marine life.21 Since 
these compounds are not biodegradeable, they remain in the 
marine environment for extremely long periods of time.22 Toxic 
substances tend to concentrate in lower organisms by entering 
through the gills, eventually accumulating in high con centra-
tions.23 Predators who feed on such organisms incorporate in-
creased amounts of toxic substances as such substances pass up 
the food chain, a process known as biomagnification.24 Since 
human food sources such as shellfish have a tendency to concen-
16 Outfalls are pipes laid on the sea floor through which treated sewage is discharged 
directly to the marine environment. NACOA Report, supra note 10, at 45. 
17 Miller, Ocean Dumping-Prelude and Fugue, 5. MAR. L. & COM. 51 (1973). 
18 Any substance on earth can be toxic (lethal) if the concentration is great enough in 
the wrong environment. In ocean dumping practices the concern is with those materials 
which are toxic or lethal in the range of parts-per-million or less, such as heavy metals, 
DDT, and PCB's. O'Halioran, Ocean Dumping: Progress Toward A Rational Policy of 
Dredged Waste Disposal, 12 ENVTL L. 745,751 (1981). See also Hearings on S.1067 Before 
the Subcommittee on Oceans and Atmosphere of the Committee on Commerce, 93d Cong., 
1st sess. 350 (1973). 
19 1970 Ocean Dumping Report, supra note 1, at 13. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. See also Radin, Concern Rises as Fish Cancers are Studied, Boston Sunday 
Globe, Feb. 26, 1984, at 1, 14. 
22 1970 Ocean Dumping Report, supra note 1, at 13. This failure to biodegrade is known 
as persistence. I d. 
23 NACOA Report, supra note 10, at 67. Some marine organisms, such as phyto-
plankton, extract nutrients directly from ocean waters and can store pollutants in concen-
trations from several hundred to several hundred thousand times the concentration of 
such pollutants in the environment. Testimony of B.H. Ketchum, Hearings on S. 2005 
before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Sub Comm. on Public 
Works, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 13 at 2294 (1970). This is particularly disturbing in light of 
the fact that phytoplankton initiate the entire food web of the ocean (all marine or-
ganisms feed on phytoplankton or organisms that feed on phytoplankton). Phyto-
plankton produce two-thirds of the oxygen in our atmosphere. Bakalian, Regulation and 
Control of United States Ocean Dumping: A Decade of Progress, An Appraisal for the 
Future, 8 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 193, 196 (1984). 
24 NACOA Report, supra note 10, at 67. 
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trate heavy metals in their tissues there is a risk that human 
health may be affected.:!5 
Organic materials may pose equally serious environmental 
risks even if they are non-toxic. One risk results from the fact that 
the dumping of such materials may cause a dramatic shortage of 
oxygen in a given area of water. Oxygen is required for the 
decomposition of organic wastes. Thus, if waste loads are too 
heavy, oxygen levels may become so depleted that much less 
oxygen is available for marine organisms.26 Such organisms may 
eventually die, thereby altering the diversity of marine life.27 
Where such organic wastes accumulate, they may deplete the 
oxygen in an area long after the dumping of additional material 
has stopped.2S Organic wastes are also dangerous because they 
contain human pathogens such as hepatitis and polio virus.29 
Such pathogens may be concentrated by marine organisms and 
returned to humans through the consumption of shellfish.:xl 
Moreover, humans may become infected when exposed to patho-
gen contaminated waters through swimming and other aquatic 
sportS.31 
Contaminants are usually ocean dumped in three forms: 
dredged materials, sewage sludge, and industrial waste.32 
Dredged material is the sediment removed from rivers and other 
waterways in order to improve navigation.33 It represents the 
largest category of ocean dumped waste, and its composition var-
ies depending on its origin.34 Roughly one-third of all dredge ma-
terial is contaminated in some manner.35 Dredged material con-
25 1970 Ocean Dumping Report, supra note 1, at 16. Between 1953 and 1960, 111 
persons near Minamata Bay, Japan were either killed or suffered serious neurological 
damage from eating fish containing five to twenty parts per million of methyl mercury. 
These people ate fish an average of one-half to three times per day. In the United States, 
fish containing five parts per million have been found. Lumsdaine, Ocean Dumping 
Regulation: An Overview, 5 ECOLOGY L. Q. 753, 756 (1975). "[A] single meal [consisting of] 
an adult coho salmon often contains more [of certain carcinogens] than a person would 
get from a lifetime of being exposed [to the same pollutants] in drinking water." Boston 
Sunday Globe, supra note 21, at 14, col. 4. 
26 1970 Ocean Dumping Report, supra note 1, at 14. 
'" ld. 
28 ld. 
29 ld. at 16. 
30 NACOA Report, supra note 10, at 56. 
31 ld. at 57. 
32 NACOA Report, supra note 10, at 44. 
33 ld. at 46. 
34 ld. 
35 ld. at 47. 
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taminants commonly include toxic metals, synthetic organics (e.g. 
PCB's), and organic matter.36 
Sewage sludge is the solid material remaining after waste 
water treatment.37 It is the second largest quantity of ocean 
dumped material.38 Like dredged material, its chemical composi-
tion varies depending upon the processes employed by different 
waste treatment plants.39 Sludge is often contaminated with toxic 
materials such as PCB's and a wide variety of pathogenic bacteria 
and viruses.40 Currently, the only site in United States coastal 
waters where sewage sludge is dumped is the New York Bight 
Apex, an area of water about 20 kilometers (km) east of the New 
Jersey coast and south of the Long Island coastY In 1980, roughly 
seven million tons of sewage sludge were ocean dumpedY This 
quantity is expected to increase to seventeen million tons by 
1987.43 
The final category of pollutants dumped at sea is industrial 
waste. Before 1973, the quantity of industrial waste dumped at 
sea each year exceeded the amount of sewage sludge dumped 
annually.44 Since that time, however, the EPA has reduced indus-
trial waste dumping to about one-seventeenth the amount of 
sewage sludge dumping.45 Like the other two categories of waste, 
36 Id. Even unpolluted dredge material can be harmful to the marine environment 
because of the volumes in which it is dumped. Uncontaminated dredge material, for 
example, often smothers organisms which live or reproduce on the sea bottom (benthic 
organisms). Lumsdaine, supra note 25, at 755. 
37 1970 Ocean Dumping Report, supra note 1, at 5. 
3!l Bakalian, supra note 23, at 203. 
39 NACOA Report, supra note 10, at 89. The sources of wastewater entering public 
waste treatment plants include residences, businesses, small industries and in some 
cases large businesses. Id. In a process called primary waste treatment, floatable mate-
rials are removed and solids are allowed to settle. The material which remains is called 
sludge.ld. at 44. The resulting sludge may also undergo secondary waste treatment in 
which bacteria is used to decompose dissolved and colloidal organic matter (the process is 
sometimes called digestion). Id. The bacterial debris become part of the sludge.ld. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 44. Since the enactment of MPRSA hundreds of dumpers have phased out 
their activities. Most of these dumpers, however, are small. All phase-outs prior to 1979 
accounted for three percent of the volume dumped in 1978. Lahey, Ocean Dumping of 
Sewage Sludge: The Tide Turns From Protection to Management, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 395, 410 (1982). Although New York City is the only site in which ocean dumping still 
takes place, the total amount of material that is ocean dumped each year is greater than 
it was before the enactment of MPRSA. See NACOA Report, supra note 10, at 89. 
4' Ocean Dumping Amendments Act of 1982, H.R. REP. No. 562, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 
(1982). 
43 Id. at 11. 
44 Bakalian, supra note 23, at 203. 
45 Id. 
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the composition of industrial waste varies depending upon its 
origin.46 Refinery wastes, for example, usually contain toxic inor-
ganic wastes such as cyanides and heavy metals, while pulp and 
paper mill wastes often contain toxic organic constituents.47 Al-
though the quantity of industrial dumping has been reduced 
significantly, such dumping still poses serious threats to the 
marine environment, because such wastes are extremely toxic.48 
Although ocean dumping endangers the marine environment, 
it has many more advocates than it did a decade ago. In consider-
ing the arguments in favor of ocean dumping, it should be re-
membered that the scientific community is sharply divided on the 
effects of ocean dumping. While the traditional wisdom suggests a 
policy of caution, new approaches assert that ocean dumping may 
be relatively innocuous in some circumstances. 
III. THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF OCEAN DUMPING 
There are generally two arguments advanced in favor of ocean 
dumping. First, there is a growing recognition that the alterna-
tives to ocean dumping may pose greater environmental risks 
than those incurred in ocean dumping.49 Second, many members 
of the scientific community believe that the oceans possess a 
tremendous capacity to assimilate waste.50 Each of these argu-
ments will be considered in turn. 
If the medium of water is not used for waste disposal, the 
mediums of land or air must then be used. There are currently 
three commercially feasible alternatives to disposing waste in the 
medium of ocean water: land filling, land spreading, and incinera-
tion.51 Landfilling is a process which involves impounding waste in 
storage lagoons, basins or pits.52 Landspreading is the use of 
waste as fertilizer or soil conditioner. 53 Incineration is simply the 
burning of the waste. 
A major risk posed by the landbased alternatives is that 
groundwater may become polluted if contaminants leach through 
46 1970 Ocean Dumping Report, supra note 1, at 4. 
47 Id. 
4" Bakalian, supra note 23, at 203. 
49 Lahey, supra note 41, at 417. 
50 Id.; see also Guarino, Nelson & Almeida, Ocean Disposal as an Ultimate Disposal 
Method, 51 J. WATER POLLUTION CONTROL FED'N 773-82 (1979). 
51 Lahey, supra note 41, at 41l. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
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the soil:';4 Furthermore, toxic metals from deposited waste are 
thought to accumulate in the soil,53 These metals may be subse-
quently absorbed by crops and introduced into the human food 
chain.,)6 The presence of persistent chemicals such as PCB's in 
sludge raises particular concern.57 
Although incineration is the most effective method of destroy-
ing extremely toxic wastes, it may pose risks to the environment 
because substances which are not completely destroyed may be 
released into the atmosphere in the form of gases.58 Ash produced 
in the incineration process also raises special environmental prob-
lems due to its tendency to concentrate heavy metals and disperse 
them into the atmosphere.59 
In light of the dangers imposed by these alternatives to ocean 
dumping, the second argument in favor of ocean dumping be-
comes attractive. Recent studies assert that the ocean's assimila-
tive capability is much greater than previously suspected.60 This 
ability is illustrated by the speed with which some well studied 
dump sites have recovered after harmful dumping practices have 
been discontinued. For example, studies conducted after the City 
of Philadelphia ceased its dumping operations indicated that con-
centrations of bacteria and viruses in local shellfish dropped 
enough for the Food and Drug Administration to lift restrictions 
on shellfishing.61 Two researchers have gone as far as to assert 
that the dumping of raw sewage into the coastal waters of Brazil 
has been relatively acceptable.62 Their reports assert that the 
waters of the dump site tend to disperse waste over such a large 
area that little harm results.63 
.'4 NACOA Report, supra note 10, at 53. 
" Id. 
"" Id. at 60. 
57 Id. at 61. 
5M Id. at 49. 
59 Id. at 52. The hazard may be reduced, however, by installing high-efficiency particle 
collectors to trap the ash before it is dispersed. 
60 See generally, Guarino, Nelson & Almeida, supra note 50, at 782; NATIONAL OCEANIC 
& ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, ASSIMILATIVE CAPACITY OF UNITED STATES COAS-
TAL WATERS FOR POLLUTANTS (1979); Ocean's Assimilative Capacity for Waste and 
Ocean Dumping Deadline: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Oceanography of the House 
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); 12 ENVTL 
REP. (ENA) 253 (June 19, 1981). 
61 Guarino, Nelson & Almeida, supra note 50, at 780. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 755. 
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The dangers of alternatives to ocean dumping and the ocean's 
apparent assimilative capabilities have given rise to a new envi-
ronmental approach known as the multimedium method of waste 
management.64 The premise of this theory is that once waste is 
produced, it must be disposed through one of the three mediums: 
air, water or land. The theory acknowledges that disposal will 
necessarily impose some risk or cost to society, regardless of 
which method of disposal is employed.65 The total cost and the 
total risk to society may be minimized, however, by selecting the 
right medium or combination of mediums in which to dispose a 
given waste.66 For example, because of its dispersive currents and 
its tendency to act as a natural buffer, the ocean may be the best 
medium for the dispersal of extremely acidic wastes, even though 
some environmental damage is thereby incurred.67 Conversely, 
land burial may be more suitable than ocean dumping for highly 
radioactive wastes, because it is considered safer to contain 
rather than disperse such material.68 Through a wise choice of 
alternatives, the multimedium method emphasizes the manage-
ment of wastes rather than simply its disposa1.69 
Although the case for ocean dumping is compelling in many 
respects, it has emerged only recently. Ocean dumping legislation 
was initially designed at a time when a relatively ominous as-
sessment of the effects of ocean dumping predominated. Such an 
outlook is reflected in the Council on Environmental Quality's 
1970 Report to the President, entitled, "Ocean Dumping: A N a-
tional Policy."70 This policy report provided the primary impetus 
for the enactment of the Ocean Dumping Act. 
64 See generally NACOA Report, supra note 10, at 1-16,92-102. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF 
SCIENCES, THE DISPOSAL OF WASTE IN THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT (1976). City of New 
York v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 543 F. Supp. 1084 (S.D. N.Y. 
1981). 
6.> NACOA Report, supra note 10, at 7-9. 
66 [d. at 97. 
67 [d. at 100. 
6" See H.R. REP. No. 562, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1982) (Amendment to MPRSA impos-
ing a two year moratorium on the ocean disposal of radioactive waste). 
6" NACOA Report, supra note 10, at 10. 
70 See generally 1970 Ocean Dumping Report, supra note 1, at I-VI. See also H.R. REP. 
No. 361, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1971); S. REP. No. 451, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 reprinted in 
1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 4234, 4235. 
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IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL POLICY TOWARD 
OCEAN DUMPING 
A. The CEQ Report of 1970 
A report prepared and released by the Council on Environmen-
tal Quality (CEQ) in October of 1970, entitled "Ocean Dumping: A 
National Policy," made an ominous assessment of the dangers of 
ocean dumping and recommended that Congress act to prevent 
the consequential harm to the environment.71 
The CEQ report found that many ocean-dumped wastes "are 
toxic to human and marine life, deplete oxygen necessary to 
maintain the marine ecosystem, reduce populations of fish and 
other economic resources, and damage aesthetic values."72 The 
report also asserted that the Nation's shellfish were found to 
contain such contaminants as mercury, cadmium, DDT, and in-
fectious pathogens transmitted from organic waste, such as 
hepatitis and polio.13 The report further noted that one-fifth of 
United States commercial shellfish beds had been·closed due to 
marine pollution, and estimated a resulting loss of sixty-three 
million dollars of seafood catch.74 The CEQ report reasoned that as 
more land disposal sites neared their capacity, the United States 
would see a sharp increase in the frequency of ocean dumping, 
and a corresponding adverse impact upon marine ecology.75 
The CEQ report recommended a comprehensive approach to 
control ocean dumping.76 Existing legislation was piecemeal. The 
Army Corps of Engineers, the Water Control Administration, and 
the Atomic Energy Commission each had authority over some 
small aspect of ocean dumping, but no single agency had the 
jurisdiction necessary to address the problem comprehensively.77 
State control, even where stringent, was found to be incomplete 
because it was limited to within three miles of the United States 
71 1970 Ocean Dumping Report, supra note 1, at IV. 
72 [d. at V. 
73 [d. at 16. 
74 [d. at 17. 
75 [d. at V. The report cites higher water quality standards as another reason for this 
trend, reasoning that if industry cannot pollute streams they might turn to the rela-
tively unprotected ocean as an alternative. [d. 
76 ld. at 33. 
n [d. The Federal Water Quality Administration, the Atomic Energy Commission, and 
the Army Corps of Engineers were the federal agencies responsible for regulating 
aspects of ocean dumping. [d. 
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coast.71l Consequently, the CEQ recommended both the enactment 
of strict measures to regulate the field of ocean dumping, and the 
designation of a single federal agency with the power to set 
standards and issue permits.79 As a matter oflong-term policy, the 
report recommended that the dumping of material clearly iden-
tified as harmful to the marine environment should be stopped 
entirely.Ho The CEQ stated that it was feasible to phase out ocean 
dumping completely and to recycle or dispose of all waste safely 
on land.1l1 As a final recommendation, the CEQ recognized ocean 
dumping as a global problem and suggested that the United 
States take the initiative and obtain the international cooperation 
necessary to control it.!l2 
The CEQ report later provided the impetus and basis for the 
most comprehensive ocean dumping statute in the world: The 
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act.!l3 
B. The Marine Protection, Research, and 
Sanctuaries Act 
1. The 1972 Act 
Relying in great measure on the recommendations set forth in 
the 1970 CEQ report on ocean dumping, Congress enacted the 
Marine Protection, Research and Sanctuaries Act on October 23, 
1972 (MPRSA).!l4 In enacting the legislation, Congress stated that 
the purposes of the Act were: (1) to regulate, as much as possible, 
all disposal of wastes in ocean waters; and (2) to limit strictly the 
dumping into ocean waters of any material which would ad-
versely affect human health and the environment.85 
Pursuant to this goal, MPRSA prohibits all forms of dumping 
except in the limited circumstances which warrant the issuance 
of a dumping permit.86 Under the Act, such permits may only be 
issued when the EPA administrator determines that the dump-
7" [d. at 30. 
79 [d. at 33. 
l<O [d. at VI. 
"' [d. at 29. 
"" [d. at 37. 
"3 See H.R. REP. No. 361, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1971); S. REP. No. 451, 92d Cong., 1st 
Sess. 9, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 4234, 4235. 
"4 [d. 
"5 Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-532, § 2, 86 
Stat. 1052; 33 U.S.C. § 1041 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). 
B6 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1440 (1982). 
712 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 12:701 
ing will "not unreasonably degrade or endanger human health, 
welfare or amenities or the marine environment, ecological sys-
tems or economic potentialities."1l7 The burden of proving a lack of 
impact for the purpose of obtaining a permit lies with the appli-
cant.1lIl 
The Act further provides for joint regulation of ocean dumping 
by the EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers.89 It authorizes the 
EPA to issue permits for the dumping of all materials except 
dredge spoils.oo Dredge spoil permits are issued by the Army 
Corps of Engineers on the basis of criteria established by the 
EPA.91 
Under Title I of MPRSA, the EPA is required to consider nine 
factors specified in section 102(a) of the Act in establishing the 
criteria which it uses to review applications for ocean dumping 
permits:92 
(A) the need for the proposed dumping; (B) the effect of such 
dumping on human health and welfare, including economic, 
aesthetic, and recreational values; (C) the effect of such 
dumping on fisheries resources, plankton, fish, shellfish, 
wildlife, shorelines and beaches; (D) the effect of such dump-
ing on marine ecosystems; (E) the persistence and perma-
nence of the effects of the dumping; (F) the effect of dumping 
particular volumes and concentrations of such materials; (G) 
appropriate locations, and methods of disposal or recycling, 
including land based alternatives and the probable impact of 
requiring use of such alternate locations or methods upon 
considerations affecting the public interest; (H) the effect on 
alternate uses of oceans, such as scientific study, fishing, and 
living resource exploitation, and non-living resource exploita-
tion; and (I) in designating recommended sites, the adminis-
trator shall utilize wherever feasible locations beyond the 
edge of the Continental Shelf.93 
" 33 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (1982). 
MM 33 U.S.C. § 1414(e) (1982). 
MY 33 U.S.C. § 1413 (1982). For a more detailed description of the joint administration of 
MPRSA by the EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers, see Lumsdaine, supra note 55, at 
763-92. 
00 33 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (1982) . 
• 1 33 U.S.C. § 1413(a) (1982). The act further specifies procedures to be followed for 
resolving disputes which may arise between the two agencies over the issuance of a 
given permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1413(c) (1982). For a discussion of the bifurcated nature of the 
permit system, see Halloran, Ocean Dumping; Progress Toward a Rational Policy of 
Dredge Waste Disposal, 4 ENVTL L. 745 (1982). 
"" 33 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (1982). 
Y3 [d. 
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In addition to these nine factors which the EPA is required to 
consider in establishing criteria for reviewing permit applications, 
section 102(a) affords the EPA discretion to consider additional 
factors of its own choosing.94 
The EPA's jurisdiction under MPRSA extends to an area up to 
three miles from the coast known as the territorial sea.95 The 
dumping of all waste within that three-mile limit, whether foreign 
or domestic in origin, is prohibited unless authorized by permit.96 
In addition, the Act extends jurisdiction to an area up to an 
additional twelve miles beyond the three-mile limit for all mate-
rial originating within the United States by prohibiting the 
transportation of any material through the twelve mile area 
(known as the contiguous zone) for the purpose of dumping it into 
ocean waters without a permit.97 Thus the Act has a total jurisdic-
tion of fifteen miles from the United States coast. 
Structurally, MPRSA is arranged in three titles. Title I involves 
the regulatory provisions previously discussed.98 Title II au-
thorizes the Secretary of Commerce, in conjunction with the 
Coast Guard and the EPA, to develop an extensive program for 
researching and monitoring the effects of permitted dumping 
activities.99 Title III of the Act authorizes the Secretary of Com-
merce to designate as marine sanctuaries those areas of the 
"oceans, coastal and other waters which he finds necessary to 
preserve or restore for their conservation, recreational, or aes-
thetic values.moo 
Since MPRSA's original enactment, Congress has amended the 
statute on two occasions. One amendment was enacted in 1974 to 
incorporate an international treaty known as the International 
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of 
Waste (The London Dumping Convention).lOl In 1977 MPRSA was 
94 Id. 
95 33 U.S.C. § 1411(b) (1982). The territorial sea is an area which extends three miles 
from the United States coastline. See Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contigu-
ous Zone, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639. 
96 33 U.S.C. § 1411(b) (1982). 
97 Id. The twelve mile area is known as the contiguous zone. It is that area "contiguous 
with the territorial sea extending to a line twelve nautical miles seaward from the base 
line from which the territorial sea is measured." 33 U.S.C. § 1411(b)(1) (1982). See Conven-
tion on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639. 
98 33 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1440 (1982). 
99 33 U.S.C. § 1411 (1982). 
100 16 U.S.C. § 1432 (1982). 
101 33 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (1982). 
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again amended to impose a statutory deadline to end the dump-
ing of harmful sewage sludge.102 Since each of these amendments 
radically altered the effect of the original Act, each will be dis-
cussed separately. 
2. 'l'he London Dumping Convention 103 
While ocean dumping legislation was being introduced in Con-
gress in the early seventies, the United States began to seek an 
international agreement on the regulation of ocean dumping 
through the United Nations Conference on the Human Environ-
ment.104 In June of 1971, the United States submitted to that 
conference a draft ocean dumping treaty similar to the legislation 
pending before Congress. 105 
During November, 1972, an 80-nation conference met in London 
and developed the text of the International Convention on the 
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes if--ondon 
Dumping Convention).l06 This international treaty was signed 
immediately by twenty-seven nations, including the United 
States.107 At present, fifty-two nations have signed the agree-
ment. lOll The Convention requires each member nation to regulate 
the ocean dumping of substall(~es being carried from its shores or 
substances transported from foreign shores by means of a 
member nation's ship.1OO 
The agreement groups waste materials into three categories, 
each of which are governed by one of the Convention's three 
102Id. 
103 International Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of 
Wastes and Other Matter, 26 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No. 8165 reprinted in 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 
626 (1973) [hereinafter cited as the London Dumping Convention]. See Duncan, The 1972 
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes at Sea, 5 J. 
MAR. L. & COM. 299 (1974). 
104 S. REP. No. 726, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE & AD. NEWS 468, 
470. MPRSA was actually drafted in anticipation ~f the Convention. See Pub. L. 92-532, 
supra note 85, at § 109 (provision authorizing the Secretary of State to seek international 
cooperation in advancement of the purpose of MPRSA). See generally Duncan, supra 
note 103. 
105 S. REP. No. 726, supra note 104, at 470. 
106 Id. 
107Id. 
106 INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, SEVENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF CON-
TRACTING PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION OF MARINE POLLUTION BY 
DUMPING OF WASTES AND OTHER MATTER, REPORT OF THE SEVENTH CONSULTIVE 
MEETING (Feb. 1983). 
109 London Dumping Convention, supra note 103, at VII. 
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annexes. Annex I contains a "blacklist" of substances that are 
absolutely banned in all but "trace" concentrations. 110 These in-
clude mercury, cadmium and their compounds, organohalogen 
compounds such as DDT and PCB's, persistent plastics, oil, high 
level radioactive wastes and chemical and biological warfare 
agents. 111 Annex II specifies certain substances which may not be 
dumped in the ocean unless authorized by a special permit. These 
substances include heavy metals, lead, copper, zinc, cyanides, 
flourides, waste containers and other bulky wastes that could 
obstruct fishing or navigation, and medium and low level radioac-
tive waste. 112 All substances not listed in Annexes I and II may be 
dumped under a general permit, provided that the applicant com-
plied with special technical considerations found in Annex III. 113 
These considerations include the quantity of the substance to be 
dumped, its composition, form, physical and chemical properties, 
toxicity, persistence, characteristics for accumulation and bio-
transformation, susceptibility to physical and chemical change in 
the marine environment, the probability of tainting marine life, 
as well as characteristics of the dumping site. 114 
There are great similarities between MPRSA and the Conven-
tion. When Congress amended MPRSA in 1974 to incorporate the 
Convention, the only changes that were necessary to bring 
MPRSA into complete conformity with the treaty were: (1) the 
addition of a jurisdictional basis over material dumped in the 
contiguous zone; (2) the extension of the EPA regulatory author-
ity to include oil taken on board a vessel or aircraft for the 
purpose of dumping; and (3) the addition of a provision to section 
102(a)115 requiring the administrator to adhere to the terms of the 
Convention when promulgating criteria for reviewing permit ap-
plications under that section.116 Where the requirements of the 
110 Id. at art. IV, V, VI and Annex I. Article V provides an exception to the Annex I 
prohibition in emergencies in posing unacceptable risk relating to human health and 
admitting no other feasible solution. Two other exceptions to the prohibition appear in 
Annex I itself which states that the Annex does not apply to: (1) substances which are 
rapidly rendered harmless by physical, chemical or biological processes of the sea and (2) 
trace contaminants. Both of these, however, are subject to the provisions of Annexes II 
and III where appropriate. 
111 Id. at Annex I. 
112 I d. at Annex II. 
113 Id. at art. IV. 
114 Id. at Annex III. 
115 See infra text at note 238. 
116 s. REP. No. 726, supra note 104, at 471. 
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Convention are stricter than those of MPRSA, the EPA adminis-
trator is explicitly required to adhere to the requirements of the 
Convention.1l7 
3. The 1977 Amendment to MPRSA: A Deadline for the 
Cessation of Ocean Dumping 
In promulgating regulations to implement MPRSA, the EPA 
sought to eliminate the ocean dumping of all sewage sludge by 
December 31, 1981. In 1977 Congress amended MPRSA to impose 
a statutory deadline of December 31, 1981 for the cessation of 
sludge dumping, thus adding congressional force to the agency's 
regulations. 118 The amendment would seem to work an absolute 
prohibition upon the ocean dumping of all sewage sludge. How-
ever, the following provision, which defines the term sewage 
sludge, poses a possible qualification: 
For the purposes of this section the term sewage sludge 
means any solid, semisolid or liquid waste generated by a 
municipal wastewater treatment plant the ocean dumping of 
which may unreasonably degrade or endanger human health, 
welfare, marine environment, ecological systems or economic 
potentialities. 119 
This provision raises the question of whether the 1977 amend-
ment imposes an absolute prohibition of ocean dumping after the 
deadline as the EPA initially intended. If Congress did not intend 
to impose an absolute deadline, why did it enact the amendment? 
If Congress intended to impose an absolute deadline, why did it 
add a definition of sewage sludge which included language that 
might exempt reasonable sludge dumping? 
The legislative history behind the amendment does not clarify 
IJ7 Pub. L. No. 93-254, § 2, 88 Stat. 51, 33 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (1982): 
To the extent that he may do so without relaxing the requirements of this 
subchapter (Title I of MPRSA as amended), the administrator, in establishing or 
revising such criteria, shall apply the standards and criteria binding upon the 
United States under the Convention including the Annexes. 
11K 33 U.S.C. § 1412a(a) (1982). The section provides: 
The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (hereinafter re-
ferred to in the section as the Administrator) shall end the dumping of sewage 
sludge into ocean waters or into waters described in this section ... as soon as 
possible after the date of enactment of this section, but in no case may the 
administrator issue any permit, or any renewal thereof (under Title I of the 
Marine Protection Research and Sanctuaries Act of 1972) which authorizes any 
such dumping after December 31, 1981. 
II!! 33 U.S.C. § 1412a(b) (1982). 
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these issues because legislators seem to have had varied reasons 
for passing the amendment. First, in the summer of 1976 there 
was a large fish kill in the mid-Atlantic Ocean from Long Island to 
Delaware. In the same summer, the beaches of Long Island had 
to be closed for health reasons when large amounts of waste 
material washed ashore. Both these events were attributed to 
ocean dumping and consequently raised congressional concern.I:lO 
Second, Congress displayed some dissatisfaction with the EPA's 
leniency in issuing certain kinds of permits for materials which 
did not fully meet the EPA's own criteria. 121 Finally, some legis-
lators expressed the intent to end ocean dumping entirely. 122 
These varied motivations later proved to be a major obstacle to 
the EPA in interpreting MPRSA and in promulgating regulations 
pursuant to the amended statute. 
C. The Current Ocean Dumping Regulations 123 
The current ocean dumping regulations designate five classes 
of permits to regulate different types and amounts of waste mate-
rial: general permits, special permits, interim permits, emergency 
permits and research permits. l24 General permits are issued for 
the disposal of small quantities of non-toxic materials. 125 The EPA 
issues special permits for the dumping of all materials that are 
not covered by a general permit and would not unreasonably 
degrade the environment "because of either the concentrations or 
conditions" in which they would be dumped. 126 The greatest con-
centration of a toxic or detrimental substance for which dumping 
is allowed under a special permit-"the limiting permissible 
120 See H.R. REP. No. 325, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONGo & 
AD. NEWS 3262. 
121 Id. at 3264. See infra text at notes 172-74. 
122 See, e.g., 123 CONGo REC. Hll022 (daily ed. Oct 14, 1977) (Remarks of Rep. Leggett). 
123 40 C.F.R. §§ 220-230 (1979). The EPA originally enforced MPRSA by a direct applica-
tion of the factors listed in § 102(a) of the Act. It did this as an interim measure until it 
could formulate formal criteria. See Interim Regulations Governing Transportationfor 
Dumping of Material in Ocean Waters, 33 Fed. Reg. 8727 (1973). The formal regulations 
were issued on October 15, 1973 and they established the basic permit system still in 
current use. See Final Regulations and Criteria on Ocean Dumping. 38 Fed. Reg. 28, 
61()'21 (1973), (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 22()'230 (1974». These regulations were revised again 
in 1977 to adopt recent advances in marine science as a part of the permit evaluation 
process. With minor revisions the 1977 regulations are still in effect. 
124 40 C.F.R. § 220.3 (1982). 
125 40 C.F.R. § 220.3(a) (1982). 
126 40 C.F.R. § 220.3(b) (1982). 
718 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 12:701 
concentration" -is determined by a laboratory test. 127 Substances 
which do not qualify for a general or a special permit might be 
granted an interim permit at the discretion of the administrator. 
In order to qualify for an interim permit, however, the applicant 
must agree to a plan to either eliminate the discharge entirely or 
to bring it within the parameters of a general or special permit. 128 
All interim permits expire one year from the date on which they 
were issued. 129 The issuance of a new interim permit is tied to the 
completion of phases of the applicant's plan. The applicant is 
required to show progress and commitment to the plan in order to 
obtain a new interim permit after the old one has expired.1:lJ 
The remaining two categories of permits, emergency permits 
and research permits, are issued only in narrowly defined circum-
stances. An emergency permit can only be obtained where there 
is "demonstrated to exist an emergency requiring the dumping of 
such material which poses an unacceptable risk relating to 
human health and admits no other feasible solution."131 Research 
permits can be issued by the administrator only where he deter-
mines that the scientific merit of a proposed project studying the 
impact of hazardous materials on the marine environment out-
weighs the potential damage which might occur from the dump-
ing. 132 
The regulations contain criteria to be used in deciding which 
type of permit should be issued.133 In establishing this criteria the 
EPA reviewed the factors it is required to consider under section 
102(a) of MPRSA as well as considerations of the EPA's own 
choosing. 134 Because section 102(a) grants the EPA discretion to 
consider additional factors in establishing criteria, the EPA's cri-
teria reflect but are not identical to the section 102(a) factors. 
The EPA's criteria consist of seven subparts, which are used to 
127 40 C.F.R. § 227.27 (1982). 
1213 40 C.F.R. § 227.3(d) (1982). 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 40 C.F.R. § 227.3(c). In such situations, the Secretary of State must be notified, and 
he in turn must notify other member nations of the London Convention as required by 
the provisions of the Convention. I d. See London Dumping Convention, supra note 103, 
at art. V 2A. 
132 40 C.F.R. § 227.3(e) (1982). 
13."1 40 C.F.R. § 227 (1982) (Criteria for the Evaluation of Permit Applications for Ocean 
Dumping of Materials). See supra note 123. 
134 40 C.F.R. § 227.1 (1982). 
1985] OCEAN DUMPING REGULATION 719 
evaluate a given application in two stages. 135 In the first stage, the 
EPA must evaluate the environmental impact of the proposed 
dumping. 136 Pursuant to subpart B, technicians make an assess-
ment of environmental impact through the use of laboratory tests 
in which live organisms are exposed to water collected from the 
proposed dumpsite (bioassay tests).137 Subpart B is a threshold 
test. Materials which fail to meet the requirements of subpart B 
are determined to "unreasonably degrade the marine environ-
ment" and can qualify only for an interim permit (which requires 
a commitment to phasing out the dumping practice).13s Subpart B 
also designates certain materials, which are prohibited except in 
trace concentrations (section 227.6) and certain substances which 
are absolutely prohibited (section 227.5).139 If the proposed dump-
ing meets the standards of subpart B, the application enters the 
second stage of the process where the EPA must determine 
whether the requirements of subparts C, D, and E are met. l40 
Under subpart C the need of the applicant for the proposed dump-
ing is determined. 141 Evaluation of the application under subpart 
D determines the impact of the proposed dumping on aesthetic, 
recreational and economic values. 142 Finally, subpart E deter-
mines the impact of the proposed dumping on other uses of the 
ocean. l43 If the requirements of C, D, or E are not met, the permit 
application will be denied. 144 
Even if an applicant fails to satisfy the requirements of subpart 
B initially, an interim permit may still be issued for the mate-
rial. 145 An interim permit allows the dumping of unacceptable 
material on an interim basis as efforts are made to either phase 
out the dumping or hring the waste into conformity with the 
ocean dumping criteria. 146 In order to obtain an interim permit an 
applicant must develop a plan which would eventually eliminate 
the ocean disposal of the waste or bring the waste into compliance 
135 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 227.2, 227.3 (1982). 
136 40 C.F.R. § 227.2 (1982). 
137 40 C.F.R. § 227.6(c) (1982). 
136 40 C.F.R. § 227.3 (1982). 
13.4 See 40 C.F.R. § 227.5 (1982). 
140 40 C.F.R. §§ 227.2(a)(1)-227.2(a)(3) (1982). 
141 [d. § 227.14. 
142 [d. § 227.17. 
143 [d. § 227.20. 
144 [d. § 227.2. 
145 [d. §§ 227.2(b) and 227.3. 
146 [d. § 227.23. 
147 [d. 
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with the requirements for a general or specific permit.147 In addi-
tion, the applicant must meet the following three requirements: 
(1) the material proposed for dumping must not contain prohib-
ited substances in greater than trace amounts; (2) the applicant 
must show that there is a need to dump in accord with subpart C 
and there are no available alternatives for disposal; and (3) the 
need of the applicant to ocean dump (subpart C) must be of 
greater significance to the public interest than the potential for 
adverse effect on an aesthetic, recreational or economic values, or 
on other uses of the ocean as determined by subparts D and E.148 
Under these current regulations applications which fail subpart 
B are determined to "unreasonably harm" the environment and 
can only qualify for interim permits. Because materials are de-
termined to "unreasonably harm" the environment under sub-
part B before MPRSA factors such as the availability of alterna-
tives or the need to ocean dump have been considered, subpart B 
has been said to result in a "conclusive presumption of unreason-
able harm." 149 If subpart B does in fact result in such a presump-
tion, then the EPA regulations could be said to undermine con-
gressional intent by precluding a full consideration of the factors 
which the EPA is required to consider under MPRSA. Whether 
subpart B creates a conclusive presumption is addressed in City 
of New York v. United States Environmental Protection Agency. 150 
V .. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF MPRSA: CITY OF 
NEW YORK v. EPA 
Since the early 1900's the City of New York has been dumping 
various forms of waste into an area located off the coast of New 
York and New Jersey, known as the New York Bight Apex.151 It is 
currently the only ocean dumping site in the United States. 152 The 
Bight provides a final repository for approximately seven million 
wet tons of sludge each year.153 
After the enactment of MPRSA, such dumping took place under 
a series of interim permits issued by the EPA upon the condition 
that New York City would implement an alternate plan for dis-
14" Id. §§ 227.2(b) and 227.3. 
149 543 F. Supp. at 1084, 1099 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
150 Id. 
lSI Spirer, supra note 8, at 10. 
152 NACOA Report, supra note 10, at 44. 
153 Ocean Dumping Amendments Act of 1982, supra note 42, at 10. 
, 
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posal of its waste on land by December 31, 1981 in accordance with 
the 1977 amendment. l54 Pursuant to this agreement, New York 
City developed a short term plan which involved composting its 
sludge and land spreading it on various sites throughout the 
City.I5.~ If this plan had been implemented, it might have cost over 
two hundred million dollars.l;;6 Moreover, because of the limited 
amount of land available for this purpose, the useful life of such 
an operation may have been only about eight years. 157 After this 
period, the City might have had to design and implement another, 
longer-term plan, at considerable cost. l5il The City had reserva-
tions about the cost of its alternatives and on several occasions 
before the 1981 deadline, it petitioned the EPA for renewal of its 
permit past the 1981 deadline. 159 In support of its petition, the City 
attempted to offer evidence to prove that the cessation of dump-
ing in the Apex would not result in an appreciable improvement 
in the marine environment. 16o The City asserted that the harm 
caused to the environment by its dumping practices was negligi-
ble in light of the damage caused by the larger quantity of conta-
minants entering the area through outfall pipes which discharge 
their waste into the Hudson River. 161 The City also offered to 
prove that the alternative disposal plan would cause more harm 
to the land and to human health than ocean dumping would cause 
to the marine environment.16~ The EPA, however, claimed that 
the 1977 amendment to MPRSA absolutely prohibited the dump-
ing of harmful sludge after December 31, 1981 and therefore 
denied the City's petition without hearing any of its evidence. l63 
The City subsequently brought suit to compel the EPA to con-
sider its evidence. 164 
Before the District Court for the Southern District of N ew York, 
the City contended that in enacting the 1981 deadline, Congress 
only intended to prohibit dumping which "unreasonably degraded 
the marine environment."I65 It further asserted that the rea-
154 543 F. Supp at 1085. 
15.; Id. 
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sonableness of the dumping could be determined by the EPA only 
after full consideration of both the economic and environmental 
costs imposed by the City's available alternatives. l66 The City 
argued that section 102(a) of MPRSA required the EPA to con-
sider such factors in determining the reasonableness of the dump-
ing. 167 
The EPA countered that the 1977 amendment was an absolute 
ban on ocean dumping after the 1981 deadline and that the fac-
tors were therefore not applicable. I&> The EPA also asserted that 
MPRSA required the agency to consider such factors only in 
promulgating criteria for the issuance of permits. It argued that 
MPRSA did not require the EPA to apply these factors to each 
individual permit application. I 6!) 
The court, in City of New York, interpreted the 1981 deadline to 
prohibit only dumping which unreasonably degraded the envi-
ronment. 170 The court reasoned that had Congress intended a fiat 
prohibition of all ocean dumping, the existing provision defining 
sludge would have been unnecessary; Congress simply would 
have defined sewage sludge as the product of municipal wastewa-
ter treatment. 171 In adopting this interpretation the court pointed 
to the legislative history of the 1977 amendment, which suggested 
that Congress enacted the amendment because it believed that 
the EPA had been excessively lenient in authorizing continued 
dumping under interim permits. In The court relied on a House 
report, which states concern that the EPA had fallen into the 
practice of issuing these permits liberally on a showing of the 
applicant's financial hardship or of good faith to phase out ocean 
dumping. 173 On this basis, the court concluded that Congress, by 
enacting the 1977 amendment, intended to stop the EPA from 
issuing permits for the dumping of material which violated the 
EPA's own criteria.174 The opinion, therefore, viewed the amend-
ment as a reaffirmation of the overall purpose of MPRSA to stop 
all ocean dumping that causes unreasonable harm to the envi-
ronment. 





170 Id. at 1109. 
171 Id. at 1110. 
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applying the 1981 deadline could only be defined by the EPA by 
balancing the factors of section 102(a).175 The opinion recognized 
that during this process, the EPA is afforded considerable discre-
tion both in assigning weight to various factors and in considering 
additional ones. 176 The court emphasized, however, that at no time 
may the EPA omit any factor entirely.177 Because the court held 
that it is impermissible to omit any section 102(a) factor in deter-
mining whether to issue a permit, it concluded that the current 
regulations were defective in several respects. 17~ 
What the court found most objectionable was that under the 
current regulations, materials which fail to meet the standards of 
subpart B are termed "unreasonably harmful" solely on the basis 
of environmental impact considerations. l79 Because this determi-
nation is made without a full consideration of section 102(a) fac-
tors, such as the need of the applicant for the proposed dumping 
and the effects of alternatives, the City of New York court con-
cluded that subpart B of the current regulations thus creates a 
conclusive presumption of unreasonable harm, which is imper-
missible under section 102.1~o 
The court found two other defects in the EPA's regulations 
based on requirements which the court inferred from MPRSA. 
The first is a cost evaluation requirement which the court derived 
from the section 102(a) factor requiring the EPA to consider the 
need for ocean dumping. 1HI The EPA's position in the City of New 
York case was that the technology existed to end all ocean dump-
ing after the December, 1981 deadline.1H~ Under this view, New 
York City did not have sufficient need to ocean dump in light of 
the harsh environmental impact of its proposed dumping. While 
the court conceded that the technology to end New York City's 
ocean dumping may be feasible if enough money were spent on a 
given project, it found that the costs of alternatives are a limita-
tion on their availability.1H3 Apparently subscribing to the un-
stated proposition that need is greater where alternatives are less 
available, the court concluded that, "absent proof of intolerable 
175 Id. at 1089. 
176 Id. at 1098. 
177 Id. at 1092. 
176 Id. at 1099. 
17" See Id. at 1099-1100. 
180 See Id. at 1099-1108. 
161 Id. at 1103. 
I" Id. at 1104. 
I," Id. 
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damage, cost is necessarily a relevant element" which must be 
considered under section 102(a) of MPRSA.IH4 
The second requirement derived from MPRSA by the court 
concerns alternatives. The court observed that the EPA sub-
jected New York City's proposed dumping to a high level of 
scrutiny under the environmental impact criteria of subpart B; 
yet in contrast, the EPA conducted only cursory tests to deter-
mine the suitability of landbased alternatives.1H;; Judge Sofaer 
found that under MPRSA, the same level of scrutiny used to 
evaluate the dangers of ocean dumping must be used in evaluat-
ing the dangers of alternatives. 1!l6 Accordingly, the court held that 
the EPA's failure to engage in such scrutiny was arbitrary and 
capricious. 1H7 
In rendering its decision, the court made no determination as to 
whether New York City's proposed dumping was, in fact, unrea-
sonably harmful. IHil Rather, the court held that the EPA was 
required to consider the evidence offered by New York City, and 
that the EPA must revise its regulations to remove the invalid 
presumption of harm created by subpart B.IH9 
Judge Sofaer's decision in City of New York has been praised as 
a reasonable approach to ocean dumping legislation H~) and se-
verely criticized as an unjustifiable interference with the broad 
degree of discretion afforded the EPA by Congress in implement-
ing MPRSA.l91 In any event, the decision has been influential. 
The EPA has chosen not to appeal the City of New York decision, 
and the agency is currently in the process of revising its regula-
tions to comply with the court's holding. 
It can be argued that City of New York has limited precedential 
value. Close analysis of the opinion demonstrates that if new 
regulations are promulgated in order to comply with City of New 
York, they would be susceptible to a number of new challenges to 
their validity. 
IS4 Id. 
1"' Id. at 1107. 
1H6 Id. at 1105-08. 
1"7 I d. at 11 08. 
1"" Id. at 1115. 
1"9 Id. at 1115, 1099. 
190 See, e.g., Spirer, supra note 8, at 2. Bleicher, The Battle over Ocean Dumping, 12 
ENVTL L. REP. (ENVTL L. INST.) 15032. . 
191 See, e.g., Anderson, City of New York v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency-A 
Return to Ocean Dumping? 14 A.B.A. NEWSLETTER (July 1982); Bick & Kamlet, The 
Ocean Dumping Debate-Continued, 13 ENVTL L. REP. (ENVTL L. INST.) 10034. 
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A. The "Unreasonable Presumption of Subpart B" 
There are two valid reasons for questioning the court's finding 
of an "unreasonable presumption" in subpart B. First, this view 
contradicts prior case law. Second, the court's reasoning and hold-
ing with respect to subpart B is in many ways ambiguous and 
contradictory. 
In National Wildlife Federation v. Costle, the validity of the 
EPA's regulations were challenged on the grounds that certain 
section 102 factors were not applied to dredged waste material 
during the permit application process. 192 In Costle, the D.C. Circuit 
held that the EPA did not have to include literally the section 
102(a) factors in its criteria. 193 Accordingly, the language of Chief 
Judge J. Skelly Wright's opinion sharply contradicts City of New 
York's holding that in reviewing applications for dumping per-
mits, "the EPA must establish criteria that lead the agency to 
consider the statutory factors on a case by case basis." 194 The 
circuit court asserted: 
We hold today that the administrator' is not required to include 
in the criteria, in any literal sense, the evaluationfactors listed 
in the Act or the Convention. Rather, he will have satisfied the 
requirements of Section l02(a), by considering those factors, 
by taking them into account when he establishes criteria . ... 
[Upon consideration of the factors], he may rationally con-
clude that the evaluation factors require certain criteria for 
one kind of waste and other criteria for another195 (emphasis 
added). 
It is clear that the Costle decision does not require the EPA to 
use section 102(a) factors in reviewing individual applications for 
ocean dumping; rather, it only requires the section 102(a) factors 
be considered in establishing criteria. 
It is important to note that the Costle court applied this rule 
and obtained the result that dredged material was not different 
enough from non-dredged material to warrant different treat-
ment. 1OO The court could have disposed of the case by requiring 
that the same section 102(a) factors be applied in regulating all 
materials, yet it was careful to set out a general rule which 
I.' National Wildlife Federation v. Costle, 629 F.2d 118 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
193 I d. at 135. 
194 543 F. Supp. at 1089. 
1"', 629 F.2d at 135. 
196 Id. 
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preserved the EPA's discretion to regulate different materials 
differently. Judge Sofaer only applied the Costle holding as it 
regarded the disparate treatment of dredged as opposed to non-
dredged material. 197 The Costle decision should not be limited to 
this narrow issue, however, because the Costle court was careful 
to focus its analysis on the more general issue of whether the 
EPA was bound to apply each factor in every regulatory deci-
sion.19~ 
There is ample statutory support for preserving wide agency 
discretion. Section 102(a) of MPRSA provides that in establishing 
ocean dumping criteria "the [EPA] Administrator shall consider 
but not be limited in his consideration to the [section 102(a) fac-
tors]." 199 In establishing criteria, therefore, the agency may use 
additional factors of its own choosing. If the section 102(a) factors 
were meant to be balanced (as Judge Sofaer agrees they should 
be:!OO), then the EPA may tilt the balance in a certain direction by 
considering additional factors. The i~sue of environmental impact, 
for the sake of argument, could determine whether a permit is 
granted if the agency were to add additional factors which are 
protective of the environment. 
The City of New York actually attempted to recognize the wide 
degree of discretion afforded by MPRSA. :?O1 Yet it curtailed agency 
discretion by determining that subpart B was invalid.:?'o2 By at-
tempting to both recognize agency discretion and curtail it at the 
same time, City of New York employs ambiguous language and 
appears contradictory. For example, the court held that, " ... the 
EPA must establish criteria that lead the agency to consider all of 
the statutory factors on a case by case basis.":?03 The opinion, 
however, allows the omission of certain factors: 
The EPA may lawfully adopt criteria, instead of relying di-
rectly upon the factors described in the Act, and the criteria 
may permit the EPA reasonably to treat some factors as 
inapplicable in specified situations. Nothing in the Act re-
quires that the EPA engage in a comprehensive balancing of 
the factors in deciding every permit application. 204 
191 543 F. Supp. at 1092. 
198 629 F.2d at 135. 
199 33 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (1982). 
'"'" 543 F. Supp. at 1089. 
201 See infra text at notes 204-05. 
202 543 F. Supp. at 1103. 
203 ld. at 1089. 
204 ld. at 1098. 
-- ----------------
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Under this logic, as long as the section 102(a) factors were consid-
ered by the EPA in establishing the criteria, the EPA may omit 
section 102(a) factors in certain cases. Another portion of the 
opinion states this explicitly: 
To comply with the Act, the EPA must have undertaken an 
informed balancing process at least in its formulation of crite-
ria, if the agency is to be allowed to dispense with such a 
balancing process in the case-by-case application of the crite-
ria.:!05 
The proposition that the EPA is required to consider the section 
102(a) factors only in establishing the regulations was precisely 
the EPA's position in City of New York. 206 It is quite unclear why 
the court initially rejected the EPA's position only to adopt it later 
in the opinion. If the EPA is free to consider section 102(a) and 
omit factors, why was subpart B invalid? When is it impermissible 
to omit factors? Which factors is it permissible to omit? 
The City of New York court eventually announces a standard 
which ameliorates some of the opinion's ambiguities and attempts 
to answer these questions. This standard however is itself am-
biguous, and offers no clear rule to delineate the limit of the 
EPA's discretion. The standard is as follows: 
... neither the statutory language nor the legislative history 
supports the view that the EPA may use its authority in such 
a manner as to allow it to exclude any factor whose consid-
eration is necessary for rational decision making.:!07 
The limit, therefore, which the court placed on the EPA's dis-
cretion is that it may only omit those section 102(a) factors from 
its final criteria which are not necessary for rational decision 
making. At first glance this appears to be the arbitrary and 
capricious standard of section 706(A)208 of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA).:109 The court's use of the "necessary for rational 
decision-making" standard, however, indicates that this standard 
is much more complicated than that of the APA. Moreover, close 
scrutiny reveals that the court's standard accorded much less 
:lO5 [d. at 1099. 
206 [d. at 1092. 
207 [d. 
208 5 U.S.C. § 706(A) (1982). 
209 "The reviewing court shall ... (2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, 
findings, and conclusions found to be ... (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, 
or otherwise not in ac<;ordance with law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(A) (1982). 
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discretion to the EPA than the arbitrary and capricious standard 
deems appropriate. 
B. The Court's Standard of Review 
Since the regulations the EPA promulgated pursuant to 
MPRSA are informal rule making under the AP A, the arbitrary 
and capricious standard of review applies.210 Under this standard, 
the scope of judicial review is limited to an inquiry of whether the 
agency decision was based on consideration of the relevant fac-
tors and whether the agency committed a clear error of judg-
ment.211 In ocean dumping cases, this standard has been narrowly 
applied.212 
In Bergen County Utilities Authority v. United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency/13 for example, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of New Jersey found that the EPA's 
denial of Bergen County's interim ocean dumping permit was 
neither arbitrary nor capricious.214 In doing so, the court joined a 
number of well-cited opinions for the proposition that the court 
must not substitute its judgment for that of an agency authorized 
to exercise rule making functions in an area where the agency 
possesses a unique expertise.2l;; The court must affirm the agen-
cy's decision ifthere was a rational basis for iUlfl In another ocean 
dumping case, National Wildlife Association v. Benn/17 the Dis-
trict Court of the Southern District of N ew York used the same 
narrow scope of review to find that the pooling of certain bioassay 
tests under the ocean dumping regulations was permissible.21s 
",0 5 U.S.C. § 706(A) (1982). See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1972). 
'11 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1974). 
'I' Manatee County v. Gorsuch, 554 F. Supp. 778, 782 (D.FI. 1982). Bergen County 
Utilities Authority v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 507 F. Supp. 780, 
784 (D.N.J. 1981); National Wildlife Federation v. Benn, 491 F. Supp. 1234, 1245 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980). In National Wildlife Federation v. Benn the court upheld certain EPA bioassay 
tests used to administer MPRSA. The court said that a narrow scope of review was 
appropriate and stated, "The interpretation of an agency that not only promulgated the 
regulation but is also responsible for its administration is entitled to great respect." Id. 
at 1245. 
'1:< 507 F. Supp. 780. 
'14 I d. at 784. 
'I' See Market Street Railway v. Railroad Commission, 324 U.S. 548, 559-61, 65 S. Ct. 
770, 776-77, 89 L.Ed. 1171, 1180-82 (1945); Bowman Transportation v. Arkansas-Best 
Freight System, 419 U.S. at 285, 290; Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 
at 419; Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 36 (1976). 
'10 Id. 
'17 491 F. Supp. 1234. 
'IX Id. at 1248. 
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Scientific data was introduced by the National Wildlife Federa-
tion to indicate otherwise, but the court deferred to data supplied 
by the EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers because of their 
expertise in the field.:!19 As previously mentioned, the D.C. Circuit 
in Costle was especially careful to preserve agency discretion even 
though the court's holding was adverse to the Army Corps of 
Engineers. :!20 
On the basis of these precedents it can be forcefully argued that 
City of New York exceeded its scope of review when holding that 
subpart B creates an unreasonable presumption. City of New 
York found the presumption of subpart B to be unreasonable for 
two reasons: (1) the bioassay tests were done in a laboratory and 
therefore do not "take into account ... [the proposed dumping's] 
effect upon the area in which it is to take place,":!:!! and (2) "the 
quality of the existing site and its surrounding area could not be 
expected to improve significantly, even if sludge dumping were 
terminated.":!:!:! As to the bioassay tests, it is reasonable to assume 
that the agency has gained considerable expertise in conducting 
them. Deference should be allowed the agency in accord with 
Bergen County Utilities Authority/'23 National Wildlife Federation 
v. Benn/24 and Costle.:!:!;" With respect to the projected improve-
ment of the dumping area, it is not necessarily irrational to at-
tempt the restoration of an area that appears to be hopelessly 
contaminated. If unreasonable degradation must be equated with 
additional degradation at a given dumpsite, MPRSA would have 
little or no effect on areas of the ocean already heavily polluted 
such as the New York Bight.:!:!6 Did Congress shape such a limited 
role for MPRSA? Nothing in the language or the legislative his-
tory of the statute suggests that Congress was willing to exempt 
heavily polluted areas of the ocean from the statute.:m 
In effect, the court's decision in City of New York substitutes a 
cost-benefit analysis for the EPA's scientific and environmentally 
protective procedures.:!:!H This is evident in the court's holding that 
219 [d. 
220 See supra text at notes 197-98. 
221 See 543 F. Supp. 1099-1102. 
222 [d. 
223 507 F. Supp. at 784. 
224 491 F. Supp. at 1245. 
225 629 F.2d at 135; see supra text at notes 195-198. 
226 Anderson, supra note 191, at 20. 
227 [d. 
228 Bakalian, supra note 23, at 222. 
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it was arbitrary and capricious for the EPA to protect the ocean 
regardless of the cost.229 It is arguable that this holding also 
exceeds the permissible standard of review. Although MPRSA 
does not require the EPA to consider cost in connection with 
applications for ocean dumping permits, the court derives a cost 
requirement from section 102(a) which compels the agency to 
consider the need for the proposed dumping.230 The court's logic 
seems to be that where the cost of alternatives are greater, the 
need for the proposed dumping is greater.231 Even if the need 
requirement of MPRSA does require the EPA to consider cost, 
the court's holding is nonetheless problematical. There are many 
different ways to evaluate cost. The court used a method that 
might be termed an incremental cost-benefit analysis. Judge 
Sofaer noted that New York City's alternative imposed a capital 
cost of $125 million and an annual operating cost of $12 to $15 
million.232 The court compared this relatively large expenditure to 
the three million it had cost New York City to ocean dump.233 
Because the court found that the improvement in the New York 
Bight was not worth the incremental expenditure over the cost of 
ocean dumping, it found the EPA's decision to be arbitrary and 
capricious.2M Arguably, this holding is not valid since no provision 
of MPRSA requires the EPA to compare the incremental cost of 
alternatives to benefits. If it was at all proper within the arbitrary 
and capricious standard of review for the court to derive a cost 
requirement, it should have examined the economic feasibility of 
alternatives. 235 Such an analysis would simply entail an inquiry 
into whether enough money is available to implement a given 
"" 543 F. Supp. at 1105. 
" .. Id. at 1103. 
", Id. 
'" Id. at 1104-05. 
'3:< Id. 
"4 Id. at 1105. 
'3.' See American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1982). 
There the United States Supreme Court clearly rejected the imposition of a cost-benefit 
analysis upon an administrative agency unless it is explicitly required by Congress. In 
Donovan representatives of the cotton industry challenged certain safety standards 
implemented under the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA). Nowhere within 
OSHA did there explicitly appear language requiring OSHA to consider the cost imposed 
by the Standards. The Act merely required that safety measures and standards promul-
gated by the agency be "feasible." The Court found that, "When Congress has intended 
that an agency engage in cost-benefit analysis, it has clearly indicated such intent on the 
face of the statute," Id. at 510. It is therefore highly questionable whether the kind of 
cost-benefit analysis advocated by the City of New York is required by EPA under 
MPRSA. 
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project. An economic feasibility requirement might be justified 
under the arbitrary and capricious standard on the grounds that 
an alternative cannot rationally be considered at all unless 
enough money is available to implement it. An incremental cost-
benefit analysis, on the other hand, is not warranted by the 
arbitrary and capricious standard because it is not necessarily 
irrational to spend sums which are quite large in relation to the 
cost of ocean dumping. Expensive ocean dumping alternatives 
might be considered necessary in order to force technological 
solutions. The development of technological solutions is in fact 
part of the legislative intent of MPRSA.:!36 In contrast to the 
economic feasibility analysis, the incremental cost-benefit analy-
sis is likely to discourage the development of technological solu-
tions. This is because ocean dumping is likely to be favored 
whenever an incremental cost-benefit analysis is conducted; until 
technology progresses, ocean dumping will be much cheaper than 
any other alternative.237 
C. The London Dumping Convention 
One of the most disturbing aspects of City of New York is that 
neither the EPA nor the court considered the applicability of the 
London Dumping Convention. This failure to consider the Con-
vention is surprising in view of the fact that the Convention has 
been incorporated by MPRSA and thereby possesses the full force 
and effect of domestic law. 23M 
City of New York contradicts the Convention since high concen-
trations of certain blacklisted substances were a major reason 
that New York City's sludge failed the bioassay tests of subpart 
B.239 As mentioned earlier, Annex I of the Convention contains a 
"blacklist" of substances which are banned from ocean dumping 
236 S. REP. No. 451, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 4234, 4240. 
237 See Bick & Kamlet, supra note 191, at 10034. The authors assert that: 
[d. 
Because the costs of ocean dumping are often so low, and because the environ-
mental impacts of ocean dumping are still so speculative, the adoption of the 
type of balancing test propounded by Judge Sofaer is tantamount to a govern-
ment sanctioned preference for ocean disposal. 
23. 33 U.S.C. § 1412(a) (1982). See supra text at notes 110-14. 
239 15 Env't Rep Cas. (BNA) 1965, 1979 (S.D.N.Y.1981). "The City's sludge has been found 
unacceptable because of concentrations of mercury and other heavy metals in excess of 
those specified in Subpart B." [d. 
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in all but "trace concentrations."240 While the term "trace concen-
tration" was originally vague in both the Convention and 
MPRSA, recent developments suggest that it was not intended to 
be defined as an exception that swallows the rule. At the 1978 
annual meeting of consulting parties to the Convention, guide-
lines were adopted which provide more precise definitions of 
"trace contaminants" and specifically include bioassays of the 
type used by the .EPA as an appropriate test procedure.241 Be-
cause the Annex I list was intended as an absolute prohibition, 
and New York City's sludge contained some of the Annex I mate-
rials in greater than trace amounts, the EPA's environmental 
impact criteria should not have been judged arbitrary and cap-
ricious. This is especially clear in view of the fact that the London 
Dumping Convention prohibits the dumping of Annex I materials 
without regard to the need to dump, availability of alternatives, 
or costs and impacts of land-based disposap42 
VI. THE PROMULGATION OF NEW REGULATIONS 
Discussion of the City of New York opinion reveals many poten-
tial conflicts which the EPA must attempt to resolve in promul-
gating new regulations. If the EPA publishes regulations allow-
ing ocean dumping because of cost or need, the EPA may violate 
Annex I of the London Dumping Convention.243 If the EPA pro-
hibits Annex I substances, the prohibition may be judged arbi-
trary and capricious under the standards of the City of New 
York.244 Interim permits have been useful in forcing technology 
and in phasing out ocean dumping in several cities,245 but dicta in 
240 See supra text at notes 110-14. 
241 INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION, SEVENTH CONSULTIVE MEETING OF 
CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PREVENTION OF MARINE POLLU-
TION BY DUMPING WASTES AND OTHER MATTER, Agenda Item 11 (February 14-18, 1983). 
See Bakalian, supra note 23, at 233. 
242 London Dumping Convention, supra note 103, at art. IV, Annex 1. See Bakalian, 
supra note 23, at 232. 
24,3 See supra text at notes 238-42. 
244 [d. 
"5 Between 1973 and 1979, EPA denied or phased out the permits of over one-hundred 
sewage sludge dumpers. Ocean Dumping Deadline Oversight: Hearings Before the Sub-
comm. On Oceanography and the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and 
the Environment of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 96 Cong., 1st 
Sess. 115 (1979) (statement of Henry Eschewge). The amount of sewage sludge dumped, 
however, increased twenty percent between 1973 and 1979. U.S. ENVTL PROTECTION 
AGENCY, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (JAN.-DEC. 1979) ON ADMINISTRATION OF THE 
MARINE PROTECTION, RESEARCH, AND SANCTUARIES ACT 7 (1980). 
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City of New York indicate that the 1981 deadline is a con-
gressional expression of dissatisfaction with the EPA's use of 
interim permits.246 In light of the court's holding in City of New 
York, which was critical of the presumption of subpart B, a ques-
tion is raised as to whether the EPA may weigh the section 102(a) 
factors and write regulations which create presumptions or 
whether EPA is required to use every section 102(a) factor to 
evaluate every application. The City of New York court indicated 
that it is not necessary to use a case-by-case evaluation in every 
instance, yet it invalidated the presumption of subpart B on 
controversial grounds and set no clear rule indicating the kinds of 
presumptions that are permissible.247 
At the time of this Article, no version of the EPA's new regula-
tions have been published in the Federal Register for public 
comment. The EPA, however, has been drafting versions of the 
regulations and debating internally over the kind of regulatory 
scheme that should be published. From this internal debate two 
proposals have been drafted: one by the Office of Water; and 
another by the Office of Policy and Resource Management. Al-
though many more versions are likely to be drafted before a 
proposal is adopted, these proposals offer some insight into the 
difficulties faced by the EPA in the informal rulemaking process. 
A. The Office of Water Draft Proposal 
The draft proposal of the Office of Water for the revision of the 
ocean dumping reguiations24H attempts to correct some of the 
defects in the current regulations that were noted by Judge 
Sofaer in New York City v. EPA. The proposal would remove the 
presumption of subpart B by ceasing to use it as a threshold 
test.249 Instead, the EPA could determine that a material unrea-
246 543 F. Supp. 1110. 
247 See supra text at notes 192-209. 
246 OFFICE OF WATER PROPOSAL FOR THE REVISION OF THE OCEAN DUMPING REGULA-
TIONS (unpublished) (1983) [hereinafter cited as Office of Water Proposal]. The Office of 
Water is an internal department of the EPA. Through internal discussion the EPA will 
eventually adopt a version of the rules and publish them in the Federal Register. The 
rules would be modified pursuant to public comment and eventually adopted as official 
agency regulations. This is informal rulemaking under the Administrative Procedure 
Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1982). 
249 Under the Office of Water proposal applications would initially be subjected to 
subparts B, D, and E, rather than just subpart B as under the current regulations. Since 
B is no longer the threshold consideration any possible presumption is removed. As 
under the current regulations, subpart B assesses environmental impact, subpart D 
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son ably degrades the environment only upon consideration of 
criteria which reflect all of the section 102(a) factors.2',o 
One of the most significant changes suggested by the Office of 
Water proposal is the elimination of interim permits.251 The new 
criteria would allow the issuance of special permits in many situa-
tions where interim permits are currently granted.252 However, a 
special permit would be issued only if the dumping was found not 
to "unreasonably degrade" the marine environment when fully 
considered in light of the proposed criteria.253 After the elimina-
tion of interim permits, no permit in the EPA regulations would 
be conditioned on a promise to phase out ocean dumping. 
Addressing the issue of the 1981 deadline, the proposal states 
that ocean dumping would not be absolutely prohibited.254 Dump-
ing could still take place pursuant to a validly issued permit. The 
other possible source of an absolute prohibition to ocean dumping, 
the London Dumping Convention's so-called "blacklist" (Annex I 
Materials), would also be interpreted in a less restrictive man-
ner.255 Under Annex I of the Convention, certain substances can 
only be dumped in trace concentrations.256 The current regula-
tions, in contrast, specify that some Annex I substances may not 
be dumped in any concentration.257 The Office of Water proposal 
would eliminate Annex I substances from the category of abso-
lutely prohibited substances and add those items to the category of 
material prohibited in all but trace concentrations. 256 
The Office of Water proposal would also require a more detailed 
consideration of alternatives to ocean dumping than is required 
by the current EPA regulations. The assessment of alternatives 
would be made on a case-by-case basis, and would require the 
ascertains the impact of ocean dumping on aesthetic, recreational and economic values, 
and subpart E measures the impact of the proposed dumping on other uses of the 
dumping. [d. at 29-37. 
250 Materials which fail to meet B, D, or E may still qualify for a permit but a greater 
showing of need under subpart C would have to be made than if the material initially 
met the requirements of B, D, or E.ld. at 11. 
251 I d. at 13 § 220.3. 
252 ld. § 220.3(b). 
253 I d. § 220.3(b). 
254 I d. § 220.3. 
255 See generally ld. at 16. 
256 London Dumping Convention, supra note 103, at Annex I. 
257 40 C.F.R. § 227.6(a)(5) (1982). The Annex I substances which are absolutely prohib-
ited under the EPA's current regulations are carcinogens, mutagens and teratogens. 
Office of Water proposal, sUpra note 248 at 16. 
258 Office of Water proposal, supra note 248 at 16. 
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EPA to consider the feasibility, environmental acceptability, and 
human health impacts of such alternative disposal methods.259 In 
contrast to the dictate of City of New York, which treats cost as an 
element of need, the Office of Water proposal would treat the cost 
of alternative programs as an element of the feasibility of such 
programs.260 The mere fact that an option costs more than ocean 
disposal will not by itself be considered a valid reason for selecting 
ocean dumping over other alternatives.261 Finally, the proposal 
states that in order to be considered viable, the option must be 
available at a reasonable cost, and must be both technically feasi-
ble and environmentally sound.262 
B. The Office of Policy and Resource Management Proposal 
The draft proposal offered by the Office of Policy and Resource 
Management (OPRM) represents an entirely new approach to 
ocean dumping regulation. The OPRM proposal would classify all 
water materials into two classes on the basis of agency experi-
ence.263 Class I materials would consist of all materials with which 
the EPA has had extensive experience. Class II material would 
consist of those materials with which the EPA has had limited 
experience. 2M The premise to the approach is that any form of 
waste management involves some degree of risk. The agency 
must therefore assess the risks of various disposal options and 
balance one risk against another in making its decision. 26.~ Be-
cause it is harder to identify risks where available information is 
limited, the OPRM proposal would require the EPA to use special 
caution and give separate treatment to Class II materials.266 A 
greater showing of need (under subpart C) would be required 
before the dumping of Class II materials would be permitted.267 
Environmental impact criteria would also be used to create 
259 [d. at 10. 
260 [d. 
261 [d. cf 543 F. Supp. 1084, 1104-05. (City of New York's cost-benefit analysis). 
262 [d. 
263 Office of Policy and Resource Management Proposal for Revision of Ocean Dump-
ing Regulations (unpublished) (August 1983) [hereinafter OPRM Proposal]. Like the 
Office of Water, the Office of Policy and Resource Management (OPRM) is an internal 
department of the EPA. OPRM's proposal is part of the notice and comment rulemaking 
process. 
'64 [d. at 8. 
265 [d. at 20. 
266 [d. at 14. 
'67 [d. at 13. 
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strong presumptions as to the suitability of a Class II material for 
ocean dumping.~6S Under the OPRM proposal, permits would only 
be issued when the applicant could clearly demonstrate either 
that the impact of dumping a particular material at a specified 
site is innocuous or that the risks to the marine environment, on 
balance, are preferable to the potential consequences associated 
with the use of available alternatives.~69 
Environmental impact would only create a presumption 
against Class II materials since the agency has had the least 
experience with them.:?70 For both classes of materials, however, 
environmental impact would only be one of a broad range of 
factors used to make a decision.271 The OPRM presumably believes 
that enough of the section 102(a) factors enter the application 
process at an early enough stage to remove the possibility of a 
conclusive presumption of unreasonable harm. 
Although the OPRM proposal seeks to remedy the presumption 
of subpart B in accordance with the City of New York decision, it 
retains the interim permits which the court spoke of unfavora-
bly.272 Unlike the Office of Water proposal, which would abolish 
interim permits entirely, the OPRM proposal would use them 
widely.273 The criteria for issuing such permits, however, would 
differ considerably from the current regulations. Promises to 
phase out ocean dumping would no longer be a condition prece-
dent to the issuance of an interim permit.~74 The interim permit 
would merely be subject to a greater degree of monitoring than 
special permits.275 Moreover, no interim permit would be issued for 
materials which unreasonably degrade the environment, thus 
removing any possible objection to the EPA's practice of issuing 
interim permits for material which violated its own criteria.276 
For purposes of applying the OPRM proposed regulations, un-
reasonable degradation would be defined as: "... irreparable 
harm to the area affected by the proposed dumping which will 
substantially persist after cessation of dumping; or adverse con-
~6H Id. at 14. 
~6" I d. at 15. 
~70 Id. at 9. 
~71 Id. The "broad range" of factors are essentially subparts B, C, D and E of the 
current regulations. See Id. 24-29 (entitled Summary of Specific Changes to be made). 
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sequences to biological resources, human health and welfare, and 
amenities which on balance exceed those consequences associated 
with the use of available alternatives."277 This definition of "un-
reasonable harm" would allow the EPA to eliminate certain ma-
terials at the outset of the application evaluation process on the 
basis of the quantities in which the material is to be dumped, the 
persistence of the material in the marine environment, or the 
sensitivity of the surrounding area.278 The OPRM proposal states, 
for example, that the EPA might deny a permit for a waste 
containing substantial quantities of organohalogens solely on the 
basis of the persistence of these quantities in marine waters.279 
The proposal further states that the dumping of some materials 
may be permitted on the basis of laboratory tests.280 The OPRM 
predicts, however, that most materials will fall somewhere in 
between the two extremes and undergo complete consideration of 
the EPA criteria.281 
In assessing need under the OPRM proposal, the EPA would 
examine: (1) the physical availability or technical feasibility of 
options; and (2) whether options are available at a reasonable 
incremental cost commensurate with the total cost of ocean 
dumping.282 Under the incremental cost concept, the incremental 
cost of an alternative above the cost of ocean dumping would be 
calculated first.283 This cost would then be weighed against the 
losses caused by ocean dumping to commercially-valued marine 
resources.284 If estimated commercial losses are found to approxi-
mate the incremental cost of the alternative disposal option, then 
the costs of the alternative would be deemed reasonable.28s If a 
substantial difference between the economic cost of damage to 
the marine environment and the incremental cost of the alterna-
tive remains, potential losses to non-commercial resources af-
fected by ocean dumping such as aesthetic and recreational val-
ues would then be considered.286 
The OPRM qualifies its incremental cost analysis by stating 
277 [d. at 17. 
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that it is not intended as cost-benefit requirement, but rather as a 
rule of reason to be used in evaluating alternatives.~H7 Moreover, 
the proposal states that only where a large cost differential exists 
could the agency state with confidence that incremental costs are 
not reasonable in light of the total costs of ocean dumping.~HH 
C. Analysis of the Proposals 
In designating two classes of material on the basis of agency 
experience, the OPRM proposal recognizes a major problem fac-
ing the EPA in regulating ocean dumping: choices must often be 
made on the basis of imperfect technical knowledge of the impacts 
of ocean dumping. Where questions involved in the promulgation 
of standards are on the frontiers of scientific knowledge, adminis-
trative agencies enjoy broad discretion in attempting to formu-
late solutions.~H9 The reason for such discretion is that such deci-
sions are essentially policy judgments and, therefore, a court 
should only inquire in order to negate the dangers of arbitrari-
ness and irrationality in the formation of rules for general appli-
cation in the future.~90 
By separating familiar and unfamiliar materials, the OPRM 
proposal in effect regulates according to the amount of discretion 
which they are afforded. Since Class II materials present a 
greater challenge to current scientific knowledge, it is arguable 
that the EPA has the discretion to require a greater showing of 
need for such materials. 
The Office of Water proposal takes a different approach to 
agency discretion. The proposal was apparently designed to make 
a direct application of the statutory factors. It seeks to remove 
any form of a presumption such as that created under the OPRM 
proposal in the case of Class II materials. Clearly, either proposal 
makes a reasonable interpretation of City of New York. The court 
stated repeatedly that the Act does not require the EPA to bal-
ance the factors or to assign a specific weight to any of the factors 
in reviewing applications for permits.~l On the other hand, City of 
New York invalidated a presumption that resulted from this pro-
"H7 [d. at 23. 
""" [d. at 24. 
"89 Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (1974) (the setting of safe 
levels of exposure to cotton dust under OSHA). 
""" [d. at 469. 
"'" See 8upra text at notes 204-05. 
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cess.292 Moreover, the court suggested that section 102(a) factors 
may only be omitted under special circumstances.293 These facts 
seem to suggest that the agency's discretion is indeed restricted. 
In any case, given the ambiguity of City of New York, it is appar-
ent that the OPRM proposal is wise to assert the greatest amount 
of agency discretion for those materials which the EPA has the 
greatest legal right and public duty to regulate. 
A second difference between the proposals is that the OPRM 
proposal asserts a greater degree of agency discretion than the 
Office of Water proposal in regard to the London Dumping Con-
vention. The Office of Water proposal seeks to remove any 
conflicts between the Convention and City of New York by chang-
ing the regulation of Annex I substances from an absolute prohib-
ition to a prohibition of Annex I substances present above "trace 
concentrations." The change would make the regulations read 
exactly the same as the Convention.294 
The Office of Water proposal, however, might result in an ex-
ception from the Annex I blacklist if the term "trace concentra-
tion" is interpreted generously.295 In contrast to the Office of 
Water proposal, the OPRM proposal retains the class of strictly 
prohibited substances and firmly asserts that other materials 
may be banned in the regulations without a full consideration of 
section 102(a) factors. Again, the differences in the proposals result 
from City of New York's ambiguous position on the permissibility 
of omitting section 102(a) factors. Arguably either proposal makes 
a valid interpretation of City of New York, as the court said it was 
permissible to omit factors in certain circumstances, but was not 
clear as to what those circumstances were.296 Clearly, the OPRM 
proposal is truer to the spirit of the Convention, since Annex I 
substances were meant to be banned without regard to other 
factors. Despite the City of New York, an exception to the blacklist 
of Annex I would violate both domestic and international law. 
The final difference between the two proposals is their treat-
ment of cost. The Office of Water proposal examines the economic 
feasibility of alternatives, whereas the OPRM proposal uses an 
incremental cost-benefit analysis. This is the one area in which 
2"2 See supra '~ext at notes 206-09. 
2"3 Id. 
2'" See supra text at notes 238-42. 
20' Id. 
200 See supra ~ext at notes 192-209. 
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the Office of Water assumes more agency discretion than the 
OPRM proposal. As discussed earlier, there may be more support 
under the arbitrary and capricious standard for an economic 
feasibility analysis than an incremental cost-benefit analysis.:!97 It 
is indeed arguable that MPRSA is a protective statute intended to 
be completely blind to cost. It should be noted, however, that the 
OPRM proposal's cost analysis appears to be more liberal than 
City of New York's cost analysis since it compels the consideration 
of many non-economic factors. Nonetheless, the approach adopted 
by the OPRM proposal may be subject to considerable con-
troversy due to the practical problem of reducing unquantifiable 
environmental damage into terms of dollars and cents. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In 1970, the Council on Environmental Quality warned the 
nation of the dangers of ocean dumping and recommended swift 
congressional action to avoid harm to both human and marine 
life. Congress responded by enacting the Marine Protection Re-
search and Sanctuaries Act which contains strict provisions for 
the protection of the marine environment. Although the judiciary 
has generally upheld a protective interpretation of MPRSA, a 
federal district court's decision in City of New York has called for a 
much more lax administration of the Act. 
City of New York has the potential to set a dangerous precedent 
for the future of ocean dumping. The principles of law contained 
therein could easily be applied beyond the context of sewage 
sludge dumping and thus permit the dumping of a large array of 
toxic industrial wastes. The court's cost-benefit analysis is par-
ticularly disturbing, since the economic cost of ocean dumping is 
usually much lower than the cost of ocean dumping alternatives, 
and the environmental impacts of ocean dumping are still so 
speculative. Since the City of New York decision, the cities of 
Washington, D.C.; Boston; Jacksonville, Florida; San Francisco; 
San Diego; Seattle; and Philadelphia (a city that had already 
ceased ocean dumping in November 1980) have all indicated that 
they will consider the possibility of ocean dumping in the future.:!98 
Moreover, the implications of the City of New York decision ex-
tend beyond the national level due to the EPA's failure to invoke 
297 See supra text at notes 228-37. 
291! Bakalian, supra note 23, at 253; Bick & Kamlet, supra note 191, at 10035. 
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the London Dumping Convention. The United States can not 
expect to persuade other countries to take the Convention seri-
ously if it refuses to do so itself.:l99 Indeed, industrial nations with a 
great population density, such as Japan and the United Kingdom, 
already have considerable impetus to dispose of toxic wastes in 
their coastal waters.300 
The EPA's failure to appeal the City of New York decision 
struck a great blow to the efforts of the United States to offer 
global leadership in protecting marine resources. In repromulgat-
ing the ocean dumping regulations the agency now has a second 
opportunity to properly fulfill its congressional mandate. The 
choices facing the EPA in this process mark a turning point in 
United States ocean dumping policy. The new regulations can 
turn that policy toward virtually unrestricted ocean dumping or 
toward a program of reasoned waste management. The welfare of 
future generations demands that the agency's choice be a wise 
one. 
:l!J!! [d. 
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